Self-cleaning: a reabilitação de empresas impedidas de participar de licitações no Brasil

Authors

  • Rafael Wallbach Schwind

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36662/20172315

Keywords:

Self-cleaning, Public procurement, Anticorruption, Debarment, Competition

Abstract

Brazil’s anticorruption and debarment rules impose in a variety of cases, ranging from two to ten years. In many situations, courts and government agencies, including antitrust authorities, impose suspension sanctions without a clear concern for the anticompetitive effects of preventing otherwise efficient and skillful companies to take part in public tenders. Until now, the approach to debarment in Brazil has been strictly punitive and has disregarded its purpose as prevention of future harm to government interests, not (only) as retribution for past wrongdoings. This article intends to identify the fundamental traits of the European notion of self-cleaning to test its application under existing Brazilian law.

Author Biography

Rafael Wallbach Schwind

Doutor e Mestre em Direito do Estado pela Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Visiting scholar na Universidade de Nottingham, Inglaterra. Autor e coordenador de diversos livros e artigos nas áreas de Direito Administrativo e Direito Econômico. Árbitro da Câmara de Arbitragem da Federação das Indústrias do Paraná – CAMFIEP e da Câmara de Arbitragem e Mediação de Santa Catarina – CAMESC. Advogado em Curitiba, São Paulo e Brasília.

Published

2019-06-12

Issue

Section

Artigos