A armadilha política: a corrupção como problema de ação de coletiva

Authors

  • Fernando Jiménez Sánchez
  • Affonso Ghizzo Neto

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36662/20152239

Keywords:

Corruption, Agency theory, Collective action dilemma, Critical juncture, Patronage system, Path-dependence

Abstract

Why anti-corruption policies fail so often? Most anti-corruption easures that have been tried in recent years are inspired by an understanding of corruption as a problem of agency. They assume that the principal is always interested in improving its control over the agent. But this does not usually happen in social settings where the perception of corruption is high. The chapter proposes an alternative way to understand corruption as a collective action dilemma and draws practical lessons for combating it.

Author Biographies

Fernando Jiménez Sánchez

Professor Titular da Universidade. Departamento de Ciência Política e de Administração. Universidade de Murcia. Esta investigação CSO2012-32661 se fez possível graças ao projeto de investigação do Plano Nacional de I+D do Ministério de Economia e Competitividade da Espanha.

Affonso Ghizzo Neto

Mestre em Direito pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina – UFSC, Brasil.

Published

2019-06-12

Issue

Section

Artigos